Abstract. A publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme, proposed by Stadler in [Sta96] , is a VSS scheme in which anyone, not only the shareholders, can verify that the secret shares are correctly distributed. PVSS can play essential roles in the systems using VSS. Achieving simultaneously the following two features for PVSS is a challenging job:
Introduction
(Verifiable) Secret Sharing is one of the most important tools in modern cryptography. The concept and the first realization of secret sharing were presented independently in [Sha79] and in [Bla79] . Since then much work has been put into the investigation of such schemes (see [Sim88, Sti92] for a list of references). In a secret sharing scheme, there exists a dealer and n shareholders (sometimes referred to participants). The dealer splits a secret, say s, into n different pieces, called shares, and sends one share to each shareholder. An access structure describes which subsets of shareholders are qualified to recover the secret. By a (t, n)-threshold access structure, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we means that any subset of t or more shareholders will be able to recover the secret; any smaller subset of shareholders will not be able to gain any information about the secret.
The verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes constitute a particular interesting class of schemes as they allow each receiver of information about the secret (share of the secret) to verify that the share is consistent with the other shares. If the dealer trusts one of the shareholders completely, he could share the 'whole' secret with the person and thus altogether avoid the trouble of using a secret sharing scheme. Therefore in many applications the dealer doesn't trust the shareholders completely, and therefore it is reasonable to expect that (some of) the shareholders do not trust the dealer either. For this reason efficient verifiable secret sharing schemes are necessary in practice. Verifiable secret sharing was proposed first in [CGMA85] . In a VSS scheme, the shareholders can verify the validity of their shares and thus overcome the problem of dishonest dealers. VSS is known to play important roles in various cryptographic protocols such as the multiparty protocols [CCD88, BOGW88] , key-escrow cryptosystems [Mic92] , and threshold cryptography. A VSS scheme is called non-interactive if the shareholders can verify their share without talking to each other or the dealer. Proposals by [Fel87, Ped91] contributed to non-interactiveness and improved efficiency.
(Non-interactive) Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing: The first proposed VSS scheme [CGMA85] has the special property that anyone, not only the shareholders, can verify that the shares were correctly distributed. In [Sta96] , the property was named public verifiability and the VSS schemes with the above property were named publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes (PVSS). Some of the important PVSS schemes were presented in [Sta96, FO98, Sch99] .
In most PVSS schemes, the verification procedure involves interactive proofs of knowledge. These proofs are made non-interactive by means of the Fiat-Shamir technique [FS86] and thus security for verifiability can only be carried out in the random oracle model [BR93] . Transforming security analysis of cryptographic primitives from the framework of random oracle model to the standard model have always turned out to be a theoretically important task which is seemingly difficult in most of the cases. Some of these problems were dealt in [RV05, HV08] . Some of the positive features of [HV08] are: non-interactive PVSS, Fiat-Shamir technique is not used, unconditional security for public verifiability and security for indistinguishability of secrets. The scheme [HV08] is described briefly in Appendix B.
Although, [HV08] successfully avoids Fiat-Shamir technique, their public verification algorithm is inefficient. In particular, for n shareholders, one has to compute 2n many pairings in the public verification algorithm. This number of pairing computations is expensive. Therefore, an important problem was to reduce the number of pairing computations during the public verification algorithm. Our Contribution: In this paper we propose a practical and provably secure non-interactive (t, n)-threshold PVSS scheme. Our scheme achieves the following:
-Public verification algorithm is non-interactive and is obtained without using Fiat-Shamir zero knowledge proofs.
-Comparing with the public verification step of [HV08] , our scheme provides optimal efficiency in terms of the number of pairing computations. In public verification step of [HV08] , one needs to compute 2n many pairings, where n is the number of shareholders, whereas in our scheme the number of pairing computations is 4 only. This count is irrespective of the number of shareholders. We also observe [Rev] that a simple modification to the verification algorithm of [HV08] reduces the number of pairing computations from 2n to n + 1. But this modification is done at the cost ([HV08] enjoys unconditional security for public verifiability) of reducing the security of public verifiability to a new computational problem. See Appendix C for the modified scheme and the security analysis for public verifiability. -The scheme is provably secure against a SA-IND (see Section 2.2) adversary.
The security relies on the hardness of a problem that we call the (n, t)-multisequence of exponents Diffie-Hellman problem (MSE-DDH). This problem falls under the general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem framework [BBG05] .
Overview of the paper: We define the syntactics of non-interactive (t, n)-threshold publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme and the required security properties in Section 2, where we also describe the (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem, on which the security of our scheme will be based. In this section we also recall the definition of bilinear maps. In Section 3, we describe our new scheme and discuss some of the issues. Section 3 ends with a formal security proof of our scheme. The work is concluded in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section we describe the algorithms that form a non-interactive (t, n)-threshold publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme, as well as the basic security requirements for such schemes. We also introduce the computational problem called the (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem, to which we will relate the security of our scheme.
(Non-interactive) PVSS
In this section we describe a model for non-interactive PVSS. In a PVSS scheme, a dealer D wishes to distribute shares of a secret value "s" among n shareholders P 1 , . . . , P n . An access structure describes which subsets of shareholders are qualified to recover the secret. In this article, we consider (t, n)-threshold access structure, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, which means that any subset of t or more shareholders will be able to recover the secret; any smaller subset will not be able to gain any information about the secret, unless a computational assumption is broken. A PVSS scheme is described by the following standard algorithms.
-Initialization This algorithm generates all system parameters. Furthermore, each shareholder P i registers its public-key (may be issued by the dealer with the corresponding secret key). The actual set of shareholders taking part in a run of PVSS scheme must be a subset of the registered shareholders. We assume w.l.o.g. that shareholders P 1 , . . . , P n are the actual shareholders in the run described below. -Distribution The distribution of the shares of a secret "s" is performed by the dealer D. The dealer computes and publishes the secret commitment value(s) and the share deriving value(s) respectively. The secret commitment value(s) commits the dealer to the value of secret s, whereas the share deriving value(s) can be used with the shareholders' secret keys to yield the share of the secret for the respective shareholders. -Verification It is required that the dealer's commitment to the secret can be verified publicly. Thus any party knowing only the publicly available information may verify that share deriving information is consistent with the share commitment information, i.e., it guarantees that the reconstruction protocol will be able to recover the same secret s. Furthermore, this verification runs non-interactively. -Reconstruction The shareholders construct their shares S i from the share deriving value using the secret keys. It is not required that all shareholders succeed in doing so, as long as a qualified set of shareholders is successful. These shareholders then release S i and also the share commitment value(s) to verify that the released shares are correct. The share commitment information is used to exclude the shareholders which are dishonest or fail to reproduce their share S i correctly. Reconstruction of the secret s can be done from the shares of any qualified set of shareholders.
In non-interactive PVSS schemes it is essential that all commitments can be verified non-interactively. Since any party can verify the output of the dealer, so we don't budget operations for the individual participants to check their own shares. Hence it suffices to have just one public verifier.
Security Model
Such a scheme must satisfy the following properties.
-Correctness: If the dealer and the shareholders act honestly, every qualified subset of shareholders reconstructs the secret during the reconstruction algorithm. -Verifiability: If a dealer passes the verification step, then it implies that the secret commitment values are consistent with the share deriving values, i.e., the information which the dealer outputs for shareholders to derive their respective shares of the secret for which the dealer had published his commitment in terms of secret commitment values. -Privacy: The very basic requirement is that, for an honest dealer, the adversary cannot learn any information about the secret at the end of the protocol.
Privacy: Following [RV05,HV08], we can more formally define the above privacy notion, under the classical semantic-security notion [GM84] , using a game between an adversary A and a challenger. The adversary here is a static one i.e., at the beginning of the game, he is given the secret keys of the corrupted shareholders.
Indistinguishability of Secrets (IND):
The security notion is defined via the following game between a challenger and a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A. Both the adversary and the challenger are given as input a security parameter λ.
-Initialization: The challenger runs Initialization(λ) to obtain the set of public parameters along with the public keys and the secret keys of all the shareholders. Besides all the public keys, the adversary is also given the secret keys of t − 1 corrupted shareholders. -Challenge: The challenger picks two random secrets T 0 and T 1 and a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then he runs the distribution algorithm for the secret T b and sends all the resulting information to A along with {T 0 , T 1 }. -Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1} for b and wins the game if b = b.
We define the advantage of this static adversary (SA), A, against a (t, n)-threshold PVSS as follows:
The advantage is a function of the security parameter λ. Definition 1. We say that a (t, n)-threshold PVSS scheme is SA-IND secure if for all PPT adversaries A, we have that Adv
Bilinear Map
Let G 1 , G 2 andG be three cyclic groups of prime order p. The group laws for all the three groups are noted multiplicatively. A mapping e : G 1 × G 2 →G is called an admissible bilinear map (pairing) if it satisfies the following properties:
αβ for all g 1 ∈ G 1 , g 2 ∈ G 2 and α, β ∈ Z p . -Non-degeneracy: e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1 unless g 1 = 1 or g 2 = 1. -Computability: There exist efficient algorithms to compute the group operations in G 1 , G 2 ,G as well as the map e(·, ·).
A bilinear map group system is a tuple (p, G 1 , G 2 ,G, e(·, ·)) composed of the objects as described above. The above bilinear map is defined in asymmetric setting [BLS01, BW06] . Also in asymmetric setting, existence of an efficiently computable isomorphism φ :
As we see later, we make use of a bilinear map group system where we require the existence of an efficient isomorphism goint from G 2 to G 1 . In symmetric setting, we have G 1 = G 2 . Known examples of e(·, ·) usually have G 1 , G 2 to be the groups of Elliptic Curve or Hyperelliptic Curve points andG to be a subgroup of a multiplicative group of finite field. Modified Weil pairing [BF01] , Tate pairing [BKLS02, GHS02] are some of the practical examples of bilinear maps.
(n, t)-MSE-DDH (The Multi-sequence of Exponents
Diffie-Hellman Assumption)
Our scheme's security relies on the hardness of a problem that we call the (n, t)-multi-sequence of exponents Diffie-Hellman problem (MSE-DDH). This problem falls under the general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem framework [BBG05] . Some of the problems that are similar to (n, t)-MSE-DDH, were considered in [DPP07,HLR10,DP08] and all of them fit the framework of general DiffieHellman exponent problem. [BBG05] provides an intractability bound for the general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem in the generic model [Sho97] , where the underlying groups are equipped with pairings. Thus the generic complexity of (n, t)-MSE-DDH and the other similar problems mentioned in [DPP07, HLR10, DP08] are covered by the analysis in [BBG05] . A proof to show the (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem as a particular instance of general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem is similar to the proof of [DP08] , where it has been shown that the (l, m, t)-MSE-DDH (l, m, t are integers) problem fit the framework of general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem. Let G 1 , G 2 ,G be the three groups of the same prime order p, and let e : G 1 × G 2 →G be a non-degenerate and efficiently computable bilinear map. Let g 1 be a generator of G 1 and g 2 be a generator of G 2 .
Let n, t be two positive integers (t ≤ n). The (n, t)-multi-sequence of exponents Diffie-Hellman problem ((n, t)-MSE-DDH) related to the group triplet (G 1 , G 2 ,G) is as follows:
where a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n−t+1 are all distinct elements in F p . Thus degrees of θ 1 , θ 2 are n and n − t + 1 respectively. We call a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n−t+1 to be the negative roots of θ 1 , θ 2 respectively. Beside polynomials θ 1 , θ 2 , the following sequences of exponentiations are also given as input,
• an element T ∈G, where k, α, γ ∈ F * p and are not known.
-Output: a bit b ∈ {0, 1} as,
Thus the problem is to distinguish if T is a random value or if it is equal to e(g 1 , g 2 ) kθ1(γ) . To be more precise, let us denote by real the event that T = e(g 1 , g 2 ) kθ1(γ) , by random the event that T is a random element fromG and by I(θ 1 , θ 2 ,ĝ 1 ,ĝ 2 , T ) the input of the problem. Let λ be the size of the underlying group order. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem as
where the probability is taken over all the random coins consumed by A.
The new (t, n)-threshold PVSS scheme
The earlier proposals for (publicly) verifiable secret sharing scheme mostly rely on the idea of interpolating a polynomial (see Appendix A) on the exponent of a generator of a group. A sketch of the idea can be given as follows:
-Fix a cyclic group G of prime order p and a generator g ∈ G.
-
The polynomial is kept secret but a commitment to the polynomial is published by publicly distributing the coefficient of f on the exponent of g. Shares (usually f (i)'s for the ith shareholder) are also published on the exponents of g. -When t or more participants come together, they can interpolate f on the exponent of g, i.e., g f (x) .
Our proposal, though works with polynomial interpolation, is based on a different approach. This idea is very prominent in threshold cryptography, e.g., broadcast encryption, threshold encryption, attribute based encryption etc. The approach for our scheme is inspired by the work of [DPP07, HLR10, DP08] . An overview of this idea can briefly be described as follows:
-Choose a polynomial f ∈ F p [x] and publish it (unlike the earlier approach, f is not kept secret). -Instead what is kept secret is a value (say γ ∈ F p ) where this polynomial would later be evaluated. Some public information is made available so that one can compute g f (γ) .
Scheme: Now we describe a (t, n)-threshold publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme. A special property of this scheme is that the participants are initially issued secret keys such that for every new secret that the dealer wants to share, the participants can use the same secret keys to derive the respective shares of the secret in question. Let λ be the underlying security parameter of the system.
-Initialization: This algorithm consists of two steps:
• Setting up public parameters: Generates a bilinear map group system (p, G 1 , G 2 ,G, e(·, ·)). Let φ : G 2 → G 1 be an efficiently computable group isomorphism. Also, two generators g ∈ G 1 and h ∈ G 2 are randomly selected as well as the secret values α, γ ∈ F * p . We assume that p is significantly larger than n. The dealer then computes and publishes
, {h
• User keys generation: There are n participants P 1 , . . . , P n and each of them is given a pair of public key and secret key as: the dealer first randomly selects n many distinct elements a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ F * p and consider the following polynomial,
• Share commitment element (SCE): This value binds the dealer's commitment to the secret and is given as,
• Share deriving element (SDE): This value contains information about all the shares of the secret for which the dealer rendered his commitment. Participants will get their share by using the respective secret keys with SDE. This value is given as, SDE = h
The ith participant gets his share S i by computing, S i = e(g 1 γ+a i , SDE) -Verification: Any (external) verifier first computes and checks the following equality,
Then it computes,
One may note that h αf (γ) can be computed using {h
. The verifier then check the correctness by checking e(SCE , SDE) = e(SCE, SDE )
One should also note that the share deriving element SDE is consistent with the share commitment element SCE if and only if there exists a scalar k such that SCE = (SCE ) k and SDE = (SDE ) k . If the verification fails, all participants exit the protocol.
-Reconstruction: Let A be a qualified set of participants, i.e. it consists of at least t many participants. Let the public-keys of the participants are a r1 , . . . , a rs , s ≥ t. Together with their respective shares e(g R 1 = e(g, h) kαfr 1 ,...,rs (γ) , where f r1,...,rs (γ) =
[ ) and e(g, h αkf (γ) ) 1 (γ+ar 2 )(γ+ar 3 ) ] Next they compute,
The computation of R 2 can successfully be carried out using {h 
Remark 2. Our scheme couldn't provide a satisfactory answer to the following problem. During the reconstruction phase when a shareholder releases his share commitment value e(g Remark 3. The Reconstruction algorithm of the scheme requires the computation of R 1 = e(g, h) kαfr 1 ,...,rs (γ) given {a ri } s i=1 and {e(g
. The recursive method (described in the scheme) takes time that is bounded by 
Security Analysis
In this Section we present the security analysis of our scheme.
Verifiability
We describe that a dishonest dealer cannot cheat the shareholders without being detected in the verification. Lemma 1. If the dealer passes the verification step, then all qualified subsets of honest shareholders will reconstruct the same secret that dealer had wished to share.
The dealer puts forward its commitment to the secret e(g, h)
αk by binding its essential value k as part of the secret commitment element SCE = u −k = g −kαγ . Thus, the consistency of the pubilc parameters (u = g αγ , h, h α , {h
) and of the share deriving element SDE=h kαf (γ) with the secret commitment element SCE follows from the facts that,
) and SCE are obtained respectively from the dealer's publicly committed values {h
and u = g αγ , -and the equality e(SCE , SDE) = e(SCE, SDE ) which essentially ensures that the scalar k is same such that SCE = (SCE ) k and SDE = (SDE ) k .
Indistinguishability of Secrets (IND)
In this section, we show that our (t, n)-threshold PVSS scheme is SA-IND secure, assuming that the (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem is hard to solve.
Theorem 1. Let n, t (t ≤ n) be two positive integers. For any PPT adversary A against the SA-IND security of our (t, n)-threshold PVSS scheme, there exists an algorithm B that distinguishes the two distributions of the (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem, such that
The security reduction is to show that if there is an adversary (A) which can break our (t, n)-threshold PVSS then one obtains an algorithm to solve (n, t)-MDE-DDH. The heart of such an algorithm is a simulator (B) which is constructed as follows. Given an instance of (n, t)-MSE-DDH as input, the simulator plays the security game SA-IND with an adversary against (t, n)-threshold PVSS. The simulator sets up the (t, n)-threshold PVSS based on the (n, t)-MSE-DDH instance. The simulator gives the public parameters to the adversary and continues the game by answering all queries made by the adversary. The queries include, public keys of n participants and private keys of t − 1 corrupted participants. In the process, it randomly chooses a bit b and distributes the shares of the secret T b using the (n, t)-MSE-DDH instance provided as input. Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b . Based on the value of b and b , the simulator decides whether the instance it received is real or random. Intuitively, if the adversary has an advantage in breaking the scheme, the simulator also has an advantage in distinguishing between real and random instances. This leads to an upper bound on the advantage of the adversary in terms of the advantage of the simulator in solving (n, t)-MSE-DDH.
-(n, t)-MSE-DDH Instance: The simulator, B, receives an instance of (n, t)-MSE-DDH as described in Section 2.4. Thus B is given a bilinear map group system (p, G 1 , G 2 ,G, e(·, ·)) where the size of p is λ. We assume that p is significantly larger than n. B is further given polynomials θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ F p [x] of degrees n and n − t + 1 respectively as described in Section 2.4. The negative roots of θ 1 and θ 2 are denoted by a 1 , . . . , a n and a n+t , . . . , a 2n respectively. This instance also includes,
, {g
• an element T ∈G.
-Initialization: B selects randomly t − 1 elements a n+1 , . . . , a n+t−1 ∈ F * p (different from the input a i 's) and construct a polynomial of degree t − 1 as,
The public parameters are defined and published in the following manner.
•
αγ . One may note that B cannot compute g, as degree of θ 1 (x)θ 0 (x) is n + t − 1. As we see subsequently that the form of g is required only for the security analysis and B doesn't have to publish it. Of course B can compute u with {g
. Thus to be precise the published parameters are,
-User Keys Generation: There are n participants and t − 1 of them are assumed to be corrupted, i.e., B will issue respective public key and secret key pairs to A for t − 1 corrupted participants and only public keys for the remaining n − t + 1 participants.
• Corrupted participants: For t − 1 corrupted participants (P wn+1 , . . . , P wn+t−1 ), the key pairs are issued to A as (pk wi , sk wi ) = (a i , g
), i = n + 1 to n + t − 1 • Honest Participants: The remaining n − t + 1 participants assigned their respective public keys from
One may note that B can compute g
. -Distribution of secret commitment element and share deriving element: B defines polynomial f , as described in the scheme, whose negative roots correspond to the public keys of all the participants. Thus,
B then proceed to select T as the secret that it intends to share among the n participants by publishing the secret commitment element and share deriving element as,
One may note that, if we set k = k αθ0(γ) , then
Thus the secret T is of required form as described in the scheme. With this, the simulator now randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets T b = T and assigns a random value in the secret spaceG to
-Guess: Finally A outputs its guess, a bit b for b.
Based on the value of b and b , B goes on to solve the (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem instance at hand as follows:
-if b = b, B answers 1, meaning that T = e(g 1 , g 2 ) kθ1(γ) , -otherwise, B answers 0, meaning that T is a random element ofG.
Thus, the advantage of the algorithm B in solving the input (n, t)-MSE-DDH problem is
In the above simulation, when the event real occurs, the simulator B poses as a real challenger for A, i.e., the distribution of all the parameters during the simulation perfectly comply with the IND security game and therefore Pr 
Comparison
We use HV and PS to denote the schemes proposed in [HV08] and this article respectively. In Table 1 , we compare PS with HV in terms of exponentiations (in the underlying groups) and pairing computations. HV uses symmetric pairing and PS is based on asymmetric pairing. Thus the group exponents are computed in G (see Section B) for HV, and in G 1 , G 2 for PS (see Section 3). A list of points to better understand the comparison table is given as follows:
-n, t bears the usual meaning.
-For Reconstruction algorithm, comparison is done based on the number of operations required for t shareholders to reconstruct the secret. -HV requires computation of 2t pairings to verify the shares, released by the t shareholders during the Reconstruction algorithm. But this number has not been counted in the comparison table as PS does not satisfy this property. 
Conclusion
We have proposed in this paper a practical (t, n)-threshold PVSS scheme that achieves simultaneously:
-Efficient non-interactive public verification.
-Provable security for the public verifiability in the standard model.
Efficiency of the non-interactive public verification step of our scheme is optimal while comparing with the earlier proposal [HV08] . We provide formal security proof for our scheme, against indistinguishability of secrets (IND) attack model, based on the hardness of a problem that we call the (n, t)-multi-sequence of exponents Diffie-Hellman problem (MSE-DDH). This problem falls under the general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem framework. [BBG05] . The security proof (for indistinguishability of secrets ) could handle only static adversaries. An interesting task would be to modify the scheme accordingly so that an adaptive adversary can be handled during the security analysis. The other challenging task is to provide the security proof under a more standard assumption.
B Heidarvand and Villar's PVSS Scheme
Here, we recall the PVSS scheme of [HV08] . A bilinear map group system (p, G,G, e(·, ·)) is generatd where the bilinear map is e : G × G →G. The aim is to share efficiently a random value fromG. The Dealer, D, will achieve this by first randomly selecting two independent generators g, h ∈ G, s ∈ F p and then distributing shares of the secret e(h, h) s .
-Initialization: Participants P i 's generates their respective private keys x i ∈ R Z * p and registers y i = h xi as their respective public keys. -Distribution: The dealer wishes to distribute the secret among participants P 1 , . . . , P n . The dealer picks a random polynomial p of degree t − 1 in
p(x) = , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where y i 's are the public keys of the participants.
-Verification: An external verifier can check the correctness of the shares as follows. For i = 1 to n, it computes
and checks if the following equalities holds. e(X i , y i ) = e(g, Y i )
If the verification fails, all participants exit the protocol. Note that the verification step requires 2n pairing computations. -Reconstruction: Using its private key x i , each participant find the share
. Then all participants pool their shares. All shares can be verified by other participants by checking the equation e(S i , y i ) = e(Y i , h). After the verification, if there are at least t correct shares, then for an arbitrary set A of t participants who have pooled correct shares can get h s by Lagrange interpolation:
is a Lagrange coefficient. The secret will be recovered by computing e(h s , h).
B.1 Security
We state the security theorem for public verification of Heidarvand and Villar's PVSS Scheme [HV08] .
Theorem 2.
[HV08] The PVSS scheme is publicly verfiable in the presence of an unbounded adversary.
C A Modification of Heidarvand and Villar's PVSS Scheme (Modified-HV Scheme)
In this Section we propose a modification to the verification algorithm of [HV08] . Thus we present only the new verification algorithm.
and checks if the following equality holds,
If the verification fails, all participants exit the protocol. Note that the verification step requires n + 1 pairing computations.
C.1 (n, t)-RDHE (The Representation of (n, t) Diffie-Hellman Exponent) Problem
We relate the security of the public verifiability of Modified-HV to a variant of computational Diffie-Hellman problem. We call it, the (n, t)-RDHE (The Representation of (n, t) Diffie-Hellman Exponent) Problem. Let G be a multiplicative group with prime order p and n, t be two positive integers (t ≤ n). We assume that p is significantly larger than n. The representation of (n, t) Diffie-Hellman exponent problem related to the group G is described as follows:
P (x) = α 0 + α 1 x + . . . + α t−1 x t−1 Beside P (x), the tuple of exponents [h, h d1 , . . . , h dn ] is also given as input, where h ∈ G and d 1 , . . . , d n ∈ F p . -Output: A tuple (h d1 ) a1 , . . . , (h dn ) an such that, (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) but h
where a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ F p .
Let λ be the size of the underlying group order. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving (n, t)-RDHE problem as
an ) | (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) but h
where the probability is over the random choice of generator h in G, the random choice of P (x) ∈ F p [x], and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 2. We say that the (τ, )-(n, t)-RDHE assumption holds on G if no τ -time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the (n, t)-RDHE problem on G.
C.2 Security
The following theorem states that if the dealer passes the verification, then all participants in the protocol must behave honestly or will be detected.
Theorem 3. Under the (n, t)-RDHE assumption, If Verifier accepts, then there exists unique polynomial P (x) such that the encrypted share of participant P i is Y i = y P (i) i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof:
The security reduction is to show that if there is a dishonest dealer A who can successfully cheat in the verification algorithm of the Modified-HV scheme, then one obtains an algorithm B to efficiently solve (n, t)-RDHE problem. We describe the algorithm B as follows:
-B is given an instance of the (n, t)-RDHE problem. This instance includes a polynomial P (x) = α 0 + α 1 x + . . . + α t−1 x t−1 , and a tuple [h, h d1 , . . . , h dn ] of elements from the group G of order p.
-B selects randomly an element g ∈ G. It then fed A with (P (x), g, h, h d1 , . . . , h dn ) and asks A to setup the Modified-HV scheme with y i = h di as the public key of the ith participant P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. -A then sets e(h, h) α0 as the secret, where α 0 = P (0). -A then publishes the commitment values (for the polynomial P (x)) C j = g αj , 0 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. Next it selects a 1 , . . . , a n and publishes Y i = y ai i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A then claims that Y i 's are the respective encrypted shares for the participants P i 's. Thus A can successfully cheats in the above claim (amounts to cheating in verification) if (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) but Y i ).
(1)
-Finally B outputs (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) as the solution to the given (n, t)-RDHE problem instance.
This completes the description of B. Equation (1) implies (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) but h
Thus if the dealer A successfully cheats in the verification algorithm then its advantage translates to the advantage of B in solving the given (n, t)-RDHE problem instance.
